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Tying Fiduciary Duties to Student Loans: One Small
Step Out of the Massive Debt
I. INTRODUCTION
Student loans have become such an overpowering form of debt
for Americans that some have referred to the current generation of
students as the “Indentured Generation.”1 In fact, it may be difficult to
walk down a city street without passing someone who has not had to deal
with such trials and tribulations, as over 44 million Americans
collectively owe upwards of $1.3 trillion in student loan debt. 2 This
makes for an average of nearly $30,000 per individual borrower. 3 This
staggering number accounts for the second highest consumer debt
category in the country, second only to mortgages. 4 Moreover, it is
estimated that about one in four of the 44 million borrowers are either in
default or struggling to stay current on their loans. 5 Student loan debt can
be especially shackling, as it may prevent borrowers from buying homes
or even starting families.6 Indeed, many Americans will be indebted for

1. Daniel A. Austin, The Indentured Generation: Bankruptcy and Student Loan Debt,
53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 330–31 (2013).
2. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, STUDENT LOAN HERO (Aug. 7, 2017), https://
studentloanhero.com/student-loan-debt-statistics/.
3. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN SERVICING: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
INPUT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 8 (Sept. 2015), http://files.consumerfinanc
e.gov/f/201509_cfpb_student-loan-servicing-report.pdf [hereinafter
STUDENT LOAN
SERVICING].
4. Zack Friedman, Student Loan Debt in 2017: A $1.3 Trillion Crisis, FORBES (Feb. 21,
2017, 7:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2017/02/21/student-loan-debtstatistics-2017/#5802b3075dab.
5. Shahien Nasiripour, Student Debt Giant Navient to Borrowers: You’re on Your Own,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0403/student-debt-giant-navient-to-borrowers-you-re-on-your-own.
6. See Chris Ciciora, Student Loan Debt for the Millennial Generation and
Ineffectiveness of the Federal Student Loan Program, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 139, 139–40
(2016) (“Student loans cause borrowers to put off financial or personal milestones. Some of
these milestones include marriage and having kids.”); see also Eric Pianin, 5 Alarming Facts
About America’s $1.3 Trillion in Student Debt, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2017, 8:41 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-student-loan-debt-facts-2017-4 (“Those with
significant student debt are much less likely to own a home at any given age than those who
completed their education with little or no student debt.”).
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life due to the near inability to discharge student loans through
bankruptcy.7
Of course, dealing with student loan debt can be taxing, but it has
become apparent that borrowers may be battling more than just their
debt. 8 A recent lawsuit filed January 18, 2017 by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “the Bureau”) alleged that Navient
Corporation (“Navient”), the nation’s largest servicer of student loans,
engaged in “unlawful acts and practices in connection with [its] servicing
and collection of student loans.”9 This lawsuit raises the question of
whether, and to what extent, student loan borrowers are entitled to
protection from servicers.10 Currently, the CFPB “enforce[s] Federal
consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all
consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and
services and that [those markets] are fair, transparent, and competitive.”11
However, with 44 million Americans dealing with student loan debt, 12
there is only so much the CFPB can do. 13 Instead, consistent standards
and regulations should be imposed on student loan servicers to protect
borrowers from being exploited and forced to make excessive payments
on their loans. 14
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides background
information on the CFPB and its current lawsuit against Navient. 15 Part
III presents legal arguments for and against servicers owing a fiduciary
obligation to student loan borrowers. 16 Part IV discusses the need for
consistent standards in the student loan market, as well as potential

7. Austin, supra note 1, at 331.
8. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot.

Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (accusing a major
student loan servicer of deceptive and unfair practices in their servicing of student loans).
9. Id.
10. See id.; see also Motion to Dismiss, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp.,
No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017) (comparing the opposing arguments as to what
duties and how much protection servicers owe to borrowers).
11. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2016).
12. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, supra note 2.
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5 (“Industry commenters, including
the two largest participants in the student loan servicing market, identify certain student loan
servicing practices where there is significant diversity in the marketplace and suggest that
policymakers require consistent approaches to common servicing functions . . . .”).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
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alternative standards and regulations to a fiduciary obligation. 17 Part V
concludes by advocating for a fiduciary duty, or some alternative
regulation, to be consistently implemented across all types of student
loans for the benefit of both borrowers and servicers. 18
II. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AND NAVIENT
The CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), and is granted
supervisory authority over non-depository institutions, including
mortgage and private education lenders, as well as other institutions
offering consumer financial products or services. 19 The Bureau also has
supervisory authority over any covered person20 who, based on
complaints or other information from sources, it has reason to believe is
“engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with
respect to the offering or provision of consumer financial products or
services.”21 Finally, the Bureau may take action “to prevent a covered
person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act or practice,” as it relates to consumer financial
products or services.22
In January 2017, the CFPB exercised its enforcement authority
by bringing suit against Navient Corporation, formerly part of Sallie
Mae—currently the largest student loan servicer 23 in the United
States24—and its subsidiaries, Navient Solutions, Inc. and Pioneer Credit
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §6,

12 U.S.C. §§ 5491, 5514(a)(1) (2016).
20. A covered person is defined as “any person that engages in offering or providing a
consumer financial product or service; and any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph
(A) if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.” 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2016).
21. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(c) (2016).
22. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2016).
23. A “loan lender” is the institution that originates the loan, or the one that allows one
to borrow money, while a “loan servicer” is a third-party company the lender contracts with
to oversee the repayment plan of the loan. Kali Hawlk, Student Loan Servicing Explained:
The Difference Between Your Servicer and Lender, STUDENT LOAN HERO (June 21, 2016),
https://studentloanhero.com/featured/student-loan-servicing-explained-difference/.
24. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB SUES NATION’S LARGEST STUDENT LOAN
COMPANY NAVIENT FOR FAILING BORROWERS AT EVERY STAGE OF REPAYMENT (Jan. 18,
2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-nations-largeststudent-loan-company-navient-failing-borrowers-every-stage-repayment/
[hereinafter
FAILING BORROWERS].
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Recovery, Inc., for what the Bureau claims are “unlawful acts and
practices in connection with [Navient’s] servicing and collection of
student loans.”25 The lawsuit claims that Navient failed to correctly apply
or allocate borrower payments to borrowers’ accounts, steered struggling
borrowers into paying more than required on loans, obscured information
necessary for borrowers to maintain lower payments, deceived private
student loan borrowers about requirements to release any co-signer from
the loan, and severely harmed the credit of disabled borrowers, including
severely injured veterans, by misreporting that borrowers were in default
when they were not.26 If true, these allegations should, at the very least,
raise some questions and concerns about loan servicing behavior.
More specifically, Navient is being accused of practices such as
repeatedly misapplying or misallocating payments when borrowers
began paying back their loans, often making the same error multiple
times.27 When struggling borrowers sought to gain access to incomedriven payment plans that would allow for extended payment relief and
other significant benefits,28 Navient allegedly steered many borrowers
into forbearance instead, 29 which can dramatically increase the total
amount due per period of the loan. 30 Borrowers in an income-driven
repayment plan need to recertify annually, but Navient allegedly failed to
adequately inform those borrowers of deadlines or obscured necessary

25. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 2, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017).
26. FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
27. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 39–43, Navient, No. 3:17cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
28. Under income-driven repayment plans, a borrower’s monthly payments are capped
at a certain percentage of the borrower’s discretionary income. This allows for smaller
monthly payments over longer periods of time than a borrower would pay under a standard
plan. Kat Tretina, Is an Income-Driven Repayment Plan the Best Choice for You?, STUDENT
LOAN HERO (Sept. 13, 2016), https://studentloanhero.com/featured/income-drivenrepayment-plan-think-twice/.
29. Forbearance may allow a borrower to reduce or postpone monthly payments for up
to twelve months. This system is designed to benefit borrowers dealing with short-term
emergency situations by allowing the borrower relief while they work on getting back on
track. The issue with forbearance, however, is that interest continues to accrue on the loan
while the borrower is in forbearance, which can add to the cost of the loan. Since the system
is designed for short-term relief, it can be problematic for a borrower who has more long-term
problems. Id.
30. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 12–23, Navient, No. 3:17cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
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information. 31 Borrowers were told they could apply for co-signer
release if they made a certain number of consecutive payments, however,
Navient allegedly reset the counter on the number of consecutive
payments made so borrowers applying for co-signer release were denied
and had to start over. 32 Finally, permanently disabled borrowers with
federal student loans, including veterans, have the right to seek
forgiveness, but Navient allegedly misreported that borrowers who had
their loans discharged under this program had defaulted, potentially
damaging their credit.33
This was not simply an isolated incident, as the CFPB reported
that between March 1, 2016 and February 28, 2017, consumer complaints
were submitted against more than 320 companies, including “student loan
servicers, debt collectors, private student lenders, and companies
marketing student loan ‘debt relief.’”34 In fact, the CFPB saw a 325%
increase in complaints against servicers during the same twelve-month
period.35
In addition to Navient, servicing companies such as
Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency, Nelnet, Great Lakes
Higher Education Corporation, and others also received a significant
number of complaints.36 The five issues about which there were the most
complaints during this period were: (1) borrower communication, (2)
income-driven repayment plan enrollment, (3) payment allocation, (4)
public service loan forgiveness, and (5) payment processing. 37
Following the complaint filed by the CFPB, Navient
subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 38 which was denied by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 39 The
motion to dismiss did, however, raise a significant question: should a
fiduciary duty exist on behalf of servicers upon which borrowers can
31. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 23–31, Navient, No. 3:17cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
32. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 34–39, Navient, No. 3:17cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
33. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 31–34, Navient, No. 3:17cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); FAILING BORROWERS, supra note 24.
34. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MID-YEAR REPORT 6 (June 2017), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201706_cfpb_PSLF-midyear-report.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Motion to Dismiss, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2017).
39. Memorandum Opinion at 60, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017)
(denying Navient’s motion to dismiss).
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“reasonably rely on [a student loan servicer] to counsel them about their
many options?”40
III. FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
A fiduciary is “someone who is required to act for the benefit of
another person on all matters within the scope of their relationship.”41 In
common law, the term has generally come to be defined as “an agent who
is required to treat his principal with utmost loyalty and care—treat him,
indeed, as if the principal were himself.”42 It follows, then, that student
loan borrowers would want servicers to owe a fiduciary obligation
because this would relieve some of the work and pressure of keeping up
with the loans. Servicers, however, would want student loans to work
like any other loan, where both sides are assumed competent and work at
arms-length.43
A.

Arguments for Servicers Owing a Fiduciary Obligation to
Student Loan Borrowers

The first argument for servicers owing a fiduciary duty to student
loan borrowers is a combination of statutory interpretation and
contractual estoppel. 44 The Consumer Financial Protection Act makes it
“unlawful for . . . any covered person or service provider . . . to engage in
any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”45 The terms “unfair”
and “deceptive” have been interpreted either in this statute, 46 or in other
similar statutes where courts have adopted and applied the interpretation
40. Nasiripour, supra note 5 (quoting Navient CEO Jack Remondi’s response to the
CFPB’s lawsuit).
41. Fiduciary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
42. Pohl v. Nat’l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 128–29 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing
Mkt. St. Associates Ltd P’ship v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 1991)).
43. See, e.g., Spencer v. DHI Mortg. Co., 642 F.Supp.2d 1153, 1160–61 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(“DHI Mortgage correctly notes the absence of an actionable duty between a lender and
borrower in that loan transactions are arms-length and do not invoke fiduciary duties.”).
44. The notion of this combination was first put forth in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania’s Memorandum Opinion denying Navient’s Motion to Dismiss. Memorandum
Opinion at 44–47, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (2016).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (2016) (defining “unfairness” as “[an] act or practice [that]
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonable avoidable
by consumers; and such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition”).
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to the language in this statute.47 The term “abusive,” however, is arguably
the most important in this situation, and is defined under the statute as
any act or practice that, inter alia, “takes unreasonable advantage of . . .
the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the
interests of the consumer.”48 This is in essence the contractual concept
of promissory estoppel.49 It is important to note that the requisite
“promise” here does not need to be explicit, but rather can be implied by
language or other conduct.50 Thus, if a servicer, either through statements
or conduct, creates a “reasonable reliance by the consumer” that it will
act “in the interest of the consumer,” it cannot then take unreasonable
advantage of that reliance. 51
Since Navient is the nation’s largest servicer of student loans, 52
and currently involved in litigation concerning this particular practice, 53
it is the ideal candidate to use as illustrative evidence here. Navient’s
website is littered with statements urging borrowers to reach out if they
are experiencing problems, asserting that the corporation has the
resources and expertise to help borrowers “achieve financial success” and

47. See id. (discussing the meaning of deceptive and unfair practices); Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1193 n.7 (adopting the definition given to “deceptive
act or practice” under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) as applicable to
the language in 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (defining
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as acts or practices involving foreign commerce that
“cause or are likely to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States; or involve
material conduct occurring within the United States”).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(C).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (“A promise which the promisor
should reasonable expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promise or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.”).
50. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 534 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a) (“[J]ust as assent may be manifested by
words or other conduct, sometimes including silence, so intention to make a promise may be
manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances . . . .”).
51. See Memorandum Opinion at 19, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No.
3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“Navient’s alleged practice is abusive under the CFP
Act if Navient took unreasonable advantage of a borrower’s reasonable reliance that Navient
would act in the borrower’s interest.”).
52. See David Scheer, JPMorgan to Sell $6.9 Billion of Student Loans to Navient,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0418/navient-agrees-to-buy-6-9-billion-of-student-debt-from-jpmorgan (discussing how the
Navient, “the largest servicer of student loans in the U.S.,” has just agreed to buy a $6.9 billion
portfolio of student loans from JPMorgan Chase & Co.).
53. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Navient, No. 3:17-cv00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging Navient has been or continues to be involved in
practices in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)).

216

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 22

“make the right decision for [their] situation.”54 Furthermore, Navient’s
Chief Executive Officer Jack Remondi has repeatedly made statements
urging borrowers to reach out for assistance, quite possibly implying a
level of fiduciary care that Navient would assume with borrowers.55
Since Navient is not the only servicer to make these types of statements, 56
it is conceivable that a court may find these servicers to be holding
themselves out as fiduciaries to borrowers. 57
Even if a servicer has not made such statements, it could still be
subject to a fiduciary obligation due to statements made by the

54. See Who We Are, NAVIENT, https://www.navient.com/about/who-we-are/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2017) (“We help our clients and millions of Americans achieve financial success
through our services and support.”); Avoiding Delinquency and Default, NAVIENT, https://
www.navient.com/loan-customers/postponing-payments/avoiding-default/ (last visited Sept.
9, 2017) (“Our representatives can help you by identifying options and solutions, so you can
make the right decision for your situation.”); 5 Habits of Successful Borrowers, NAVIENT,
https://www.navient.com/loan-customers/getting-started/successful-student-loan-borrowers/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“Navient is here to help. We’ve found that, 9 times out of 10,
when we can talk to a struggling federal loan customer we can help him or her get on an
affordable payment plan and avoid default.”).
55. See Jack Remondi, Four Recommendations to Improve Student Loan Success,
MEDIUM (Apr. 12, 2016), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/four-recommendations-toimprove-student-loan-success-94488bf0bb7f (“If borrowers are led to believe that calling
their servicer is useless, who benefits? There needs to be a concerted effort to encourage
borrowers to contact their loan servicer as a resource.”); Jack Remondi, It’s Time to Put
Students First, MEDIUM (May 23, 2016), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/its-time-toput-students-first-7cd578ca266e (“At Navient, we make it a priority to educate our federal
borrowers about income-driven options” . . . “Help is a phone call away.”); Jack Remondi, 4
Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program: A Common Sense Recipe for Reform, MEDIUM
(Feb. 12, 2017), https://medium.com/@JackRemondi/4-ideas-for-a-better-student-loanprogram-a-common-sense-recipe-for-reform-521e651d612 (“For some borrowers, student
loan debt can be especially daunting. The good news is that borrowers can turn to their student
loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”); Nasiripour, supra note
5 (noting that in September 2014, Remondi told investors at a Wall Street conference, “[o]ur
job as a servicer is to really work with those customers and make sure that they understand
the differences and which program best fits their needs”).
56. See Welcome to FedLoan Servicing!, FEDLOAN SERVICING, https://myfedloan.org/
(last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“We are your student loan servicer and we have one goal: to help
you successfully repay your loans.”); Get to Know Mohela, MOHELA, https://
www.mohela.com/DL/common/about.aspx (last visited Sept. 9 2017) (“As your
knowledgeable and approachable go-to resource for account information and repayment
options, we provide the tools to help you successfully repay your student loan.”).
57. There has already been some inclination that this is a possibility, or at least not an
unreasonable argument. In response to Navient’s Motion to Dismiss, Judge Robert D.
Mariani declined to dismiss the argument that Navient created a reasonable expectation to act
in the interest of its customers. See Memorandum Opinion at 46, Navient, No. 3:17-cv-00101
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“It is therefore enough that a borrower’s reliance that a loan servicer
will act in their interest is reasonable, irrespective of whether a legal duty actually exists on
the part of the loan servicer to act in the borrower’s interest.”).
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Department of Education (“Department”).58 Not only does the
Department’s website make claims and urge borrowers to reach out to
servicers similar to the claims and statements on other servicers’
websites, 59 but current and former agents of the Department have also
made statements that would imply a fiduciary duty. 60 This includes
former Director of the Office of Postsecondary Education David
Bergeron who said, “[t]he Education Department ultimately is asking
loan servicers to act on its behalf to fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to
borrowers.”61 The Department contracts out the servicing of these federal
loans to servicers and, as such, the servicer is beholden to the lender in
certain aspects of the loan terms.62 Professor William J. Cox has argued
that only lenders can hold servicers accountable, though they “lack the
necessary incentives to pursue an action because any action taken would
likely adversely affect their bottom line.”63 However, a lender’s
reasoning and refusal to pursue action is irrelevant in this case; all that
matters is that lenders have the ability to hold servicers accountable. 64
The fact that a lender controls some terms of a loan, and a servicer is
accountable to the lender, means that a borrower can reasonably rely on
statements and promises a lender makes about how a servicer will handle
the loan. 65 As such, if a lender makes statements or promises that imply
or expressly state that a servicer will act in the borrower’s interest, a
fiduciary obligation could be found. 66

58. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See FED.
STUDENT AID, LOANS, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans (last visited Sept. 9, 2017)
(“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal student loan
program. Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your lender.”).
59. See FED. STUDENT AID, LOAN SERVICERS, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/
understand/servicers (last visited Sept. 9, 2017) (“The loan servicer will work with you on
repayment plans and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your
federal student loan.”).
60. Nasiripour, supra note 5.
61. Nasiripour, supra note 5.
62. William J. Cox, The Student Borrower: Slave to the Servicer, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 189, 192 (2015).
63. Id. at 203.
64. Id.
65. See Memorandum Opinion at 46, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No.
3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (“It is therefore enough that a borrower’s reliance
that a loan servicer will act in their interest is reasonable, irrespective of whether a legal duty
actually exists on the part of the loan servicer to act in the borrower’s interest.”).
66. Id.
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The second argument in favor of servicers owing a fiduciary duty
to student loan borrowers is that current case law illustrates certain factors
that may create a fiduciary or confidential relationship, and those factors
are often present in the student loan context. 67 To determine whether a
fiduciary relationship exists, one must analyze the relationship in its
entirety, taking into account the particular circumstances or facts
surrounding it.68 Courts have relied on certain factors for assistance,
including (1) a solicitation or an imposition of trust and confidence for a
period of time, 69 and (2) situations where there is a great disparity of
position70 and the disparity is considered “very important or absolutely
essential.”71

67. It must be noted that the information being cited here comes from G.G. BOGERT ET

THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 482 (Rev. 2d ed. 1978), which is titled “Abuse of
confidential relationship.” This is significant as § 481 is titled “Breach of fiduciary
obligation.” While this may seem misleading, Bogert begins § 482 with the sentences, “[t]here
is no uniform practice among courts in their use of the phrases ‘fiduciary relation’ and
‘confidential relation,’ and often the terms are used as synonyms. The term confidential
relation, however, often is used when the relationship is similar to those noted in a fiduciary
relation but does not fit into one of the well-defined categories of fiduciary law.” The
categories mentioned in § 481 include, inter alia, “[a] trustee of an express trust,” “personal
representatives of estates,” and “[a] guardian or conservator.” The section goes on to list some
categories where a fiduciary relationship has or has not been found. Under that category,
“mortgagor or mortgagee” is mentioned as one where a fiduciary agreement has been found
not to exist. As will be discussed later, this note looks to distinguish between mortgage lending
and student loan lending. As such, student loan lending does not fall into one of the mentioned
categories of fiduciary relationships under § 481, and so it will be examined under § 482. It
is also worth noting that some of the cases cited under § 482 do, in fact, refer to the relationship
as “fiduciary” rather than “confidential,” further illustrating the synonymous relationship.
68. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, §§ 481, 482.
69. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482; see also Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381
(7th Cir. 1992) (“If a person solicits another to trust him in matters in which he represents
himself to be expert as well as trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer
and reposes complete trust in him, a fiduciary relation is established.”); Grenier v. Harley,
250 F.2d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding a confidential relationship existed where the
defendant, prior to the death of the decedent, acted as his business agent and attorney, and
decedent reposed trust and confidence in defendent); Lee v. Choi, 754 S.E.2d 371, 375–76
(Ga. Ct. App. 2013) (finding that a fiduciary duty existed because defendant had a relationship
with plaintiffs in which he “was in a position of trust and confidence, was entrusted with
financial responsibility and authority, and was privy to personal information”).
70. The “disparity of position” here is a general term to be determined on a case by case
basis. The disparity can be in regards to bargaining power, management power, level of
sophistication, dependence, influence, etc. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482 n.7.
71. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482; see also Miller, 957 F.2d 1375; Francois v.
Francois, 599 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3rd Cir. 1979) (noting that a confidential relationship arises
when one party places confidence in another, which results in superiority and influence on
one side); Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 352, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976)
(“Disparity of business experience and invited confidence could be a legally sufficient basis
for finding a fiduciary relationship”).
AL.,
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As mentioned previously, student loan servicers and the
Department of Education do their part in soliciting borrowers to place
their trust and confidence in servicers. 72 More important, however, is the
disparity of position between servicers and student loan borrowers.
Student borrowers are in an especially weak position because of their
youth or inherent lack of education at the outset of the loan. 73 Loan
servicers are undoubtedly experts in the field, as a significant portion of
their services involve managing borrowers’ accounts, processing
payments, and assisting borrowers as they navigate through the various
and “overly complex array” of repayment options.74 The repayment
options can be so complex that “[e]ven student loan experts are baffled
by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal repayment
system.”75 This complex system is inherently designed to have young
borrowers.76 Indeed, close to 60% of the total U.S. student loan debt was
used to finance undergraduate degrees, 77 which are almost exclusively
sought by students who were high school graduates the prior year.78 It is
also axiomatic that a discrepancy in knowledge or education would exist
here, as students who obtain student loans are generally not experts in
finance, but rather seeking to learn and educate themselves further. 79 This
disparity in the relationship between a servicer and student loan borrower
could lead to the creation of a fiduciary duty. 80
72. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“For some
borrowers, student loan debt can be especially daunting. The good news is that borrowers can
turn to their student loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”);
LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“The loan servicer will work with you on repayment plans
and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your federal student
loan.”); Remondi, It’s Time to Put Students First, supra note 55 (“Our data show that more
than 9 times out of 10, when we reach a struggling federal borrower, we successfully help
him or her avoid default.”).
73. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482.
74. Remondi, It’s Time to Put Students First, supra note 55; FAILING BORROWERS, supra
note 24.
75. Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55.
76. See Mala Gusman Bridwell, Student Loan Bankruptcies, 1978 WASH. U. L. Q. 593,
595–96 (1978) (“The purpose of the student loan programs are . . . to allow every person the
fullest possible educational opportunity by making loans available to those who could not
otherwise obtain a loan because of their age and lack of collateral borrowing history.”).
77. 2017 Student Loan Debt Statistics, supra note 2 (“About 40 percent of the $1 trillion
student loan debt was used to finance graduate and professional degrees.”).
78. KEVIN EAGAN ET AL., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NORMS FALL 2016 27
(2017) (illustrating statistics of college freshman, one of which being 97.9% of first-time, fulltime freshmen graduated high school in 2016).
79. See Cox, supra note 62, at 191 (“First, students are generally not economists.”).
80. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482.
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The final argument to be made for servicers owing a fiduciary
duty to student loan borrowers is that the servicers are simply an
extension of the federal student loan lender, 81 the federal government, 82
which should be considered in a fiduciary relationship with the people it
serves.83 Since the federal government is the lender of federal student
loans, 84 while servicers merely oversee the repayment of the loans, 85 the
duties and obligations should be viewed through the relationship between
the government and the student, or the lender and the borrower.
The question now becomes whether the federal government owes
a fiduciary duty to the borrowers and, if so, whether that fiduciary duty
should transfer to the servicer as a part of the loan. 86 There are numerous
historical and theoretical reasons, both in general and specifically
pertaining to the United States, to believe a government is in a fiduciary
relationship with its people. 87 In his Second Treatise of Civil
Government, John Locke argued that the government has a fiduciary
obligation to the people. 88 Locke’s idea was that in the original social
contract the citizens conveyed power to the government on the condition
that the power would be used for the public good and, as such, the
government was obliged to act on behalf of the people rather than in its

81. See Hawlk, supra note 23 (“In other words, student loan servicing companies act as
middlemen between you and the original lender.”).
82. It should be noted that this argument pertains solely to federal student loans, not
private student loans.
83. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 706–13
(2013) (discussing the “Constitutional History and Political Theory” for considering
politicians and the government as being in a fiduciary relationship with the people).
84. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See LOANS,
supra note 58 (“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal
student loan program. Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your
lender.”).
85. Hawlk, supra note 23.
86. See Ryan Lane, A Guide to Understanding Student Loan Servicer Changes, U.S.
NEWS (Nov. 18, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loanranger/2015/11/18/a-guide-to-understanding-student-loan-servicer-changes (stating that
when a lender contracts a loan out to a servicer, the general terms of the loan will stay the
same, and the borrowers must be notified of any changes).
87. See Rave, supra note 83, at 706–13 (discussing both the views of John Locke, as well
as those of the Founding Fathers, on government’s owing a fiduciary duty to their people).
88. Rave, supra note 83, at 708; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest
Spending: The General Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 239, 245 (2007).
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own interests.89 Locke was not alone, as this became a widely accepted
view in England by the eighteenth century. 90
This popular theory was not contained to England, as it had a
heavy influence on the Founding Fathers as well. 91 After the revolution,
newly independent Americans frequently referred to legislative
representatives and political officials as being in an agency or trusteeship
capacity. 92 The vast majority of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention were experienced lawyers or businessmen and were well
aware of what these concepts meant. 93 The Framers were not referring to
these concepts through mere hollow rhetoric, but rather implanted them
in the Constitution to “impose on public officials fiduciary obligations
comparable to those duties borne by private law fiduciaries.”94 Indeed,
these concepts were central to the Framers in the drafting, debating, and
ratifying the Constitution, and helped shape their understanding of
political representation.95
The theory is not simply based on the views of historical figures
such as Locke, but is also supported by private law justifications for
fiduciary duties.96 The political theories of contract and delegation of
power reinforce the ideals the Framers leaned upon. 97 It may help to view
the American constitutional democracy as a contract, the terms of which
delegate power from the people to the government. 98 The U.S.
Constitution is the contract, defining the relationship between the

89.
90.
91.
92.

Rave, supra note 83, at 708–09; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245.
Rave, supra note 83, at 709.
Rave, supra note 83, at 710; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245–46.
Rave, supra note 83, at 710; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 246; U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; U.S CONST. art. I § 3, cl. 7; US CONST. art. II § 1, cl. 2 (“Office of
Trust”).
93. Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 247–48.
94. Rave, supra note 83, at 711; Natelson, Judicial Review, supra note 88, at 245–47;
Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1087,
1178 (2004).
95. Robert G. Natelson, Public Trust, supra note 94, at 1083–86; see also U.S. CONST.
art. I § 10 cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (forbidding states from depriving any person of equal protection of
the law).
96. Rave, supra note 83, at 711.
97. Rave, supra note 83, at 711.
98. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WAS. L. REV. 1119,
1121–22 (1998); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (analogizing the
Constitution to a corporate charter, claiming that it establishes a “body politic and corporate”).
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representatives and the people. 99 In this contract, the people agreed to be
bound by the rules and policies of a government, only if it in turn agreed
to act in the sole interests of the people. 100 This is the basis for the
fiduciary obligation imposed on government officials, and it should
translate into the relationship the federal government has with its people,
such as through student loan lending.101 If a fiduciary duty was extended
to the people—the borrowers—the federal government and servicers
could not contractually waive the duty without the mutual assent of the
borrower.102
B.

Arguments Against Servicers Owing a Fiduciary Obligation to
Student Loan Borrowers

The first argument against servicers owing a fiduciary duty is
simply that the Consumer Financial Protection Act does not place any
affirmative duty on the part of the servicer to act in the interest of the
consumer; rather it simply prohibits certain acts or practices. 103 As
previously mentioned, the Act makes it “unlawful for . . . any covered
person or service provider . . . to engage in any unfair, deceptive, or
abusive act or practice.”104 Again, one definition for the term “abusive”
is when a servicer “takes unreasonable advantage of . . . the reasonable
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the
consumer.”105 This does not mean a servicer has an affirmative duty to
counsel borrowers and act in their best interests; 106 instead the servicer’s

99. Rave, supra note 83, at 712.
100. See Rave, supra note 83, at 712 (“We can discern those duties by asking what the

parties would have agreed to if bargaining were costless, and the natural answer is that the
people would have agreed to be bound by the rules of the legislature only if the legislature
had agreed to act solely in the interests of the people.”).
101. Rave, supra note 83, at 711–13.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a
promise or begin or render a performance.”).
103. The title given to 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2016) is “Prohibited acts.” As a general matter,
this inherently means there would be no affirmative duties under this section, only a duty to
abstain from certain practices. What’s more, there is nothing in this section of the act stating
that a covered person or service provider must do something, or that it must act in the interest
of the borrower. The section simply outlines types of practices that are prohibited.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B).
105. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(C) (2016).
106. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 611 (3rd Cir.
1995) (“[T]o be liable for material nondisclosures, a party must have a duty to speak”).
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only duty is to refrain from taking “unreasonable advantage” of a
consumer’s “reasonable reliance;” as well as to refrain from any
prohibited acts listed or any other illegal acts such as fraud. 107 Indeed,
these sections do not even assert that a consumer’s reasonable reliance
will create a duty to act in the consumer’s interests; they only state that if
a consumer does in fact reasonably rely on the servicer to act in his or her
interest, the servicer cannot take “unreasonable advantage” of that
reliance. 108 This, again, is not a duty to act in a certain way, but rather a
duty to refrain from acting in a certain way. 109
The next argument against fiduciary duties comes from current
case law, where courts have consistently held that in mortgage lending
practices a loan servicer generally does not owe a fiduciary duty to a
borrower.110 While there may be some differences in the terms,
mortgages and student loans are both loans nonetheless.111 Like student
loans, mortgages have servicers who handle the loans. 112 So why should
servicers of student loans be assigned a higher duty of care than mortgage
loan servicers if there is no material difference between the two? The
107. 12 U.S.C. § 5536.
108. 12 U.S.C. § 5536; 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
109. Judge Mariani seemingly rejected this argument as it pertained to Navient’s Motion

to Dismiss in Memorandum Opinion at 46–47, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp.,
No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017). However, the decision was not entirely based on
the merits of the argument, but rather Judge Mariani found that Navient “placed reliance
inducing statements on their webpage,” and there was sufficient evidence to the claim that
Navient had taken unreasonable advantage of that reliance. It is also worth noting that this
was an opinion rejecting a motion to dismiss, not deciding the case on its merits. The argument
being made here is not based specifically on Navient, but rather on a hypothetical servicer
who has not made reliance inducing statements and has not taken unreasonable advantage of
its consumers.
110. See, e.g., Bret Binder v. Weststar Mortg., Inc., No. CV 14-7073, 2016 WL 3762710,
at *20 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2016) (“Much like mortgage lenders, loan servicers do not owe
borrowers any specific fiduciary duties based upon their servicer/borrower relationship.”);
Edwards v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLP, 24 F.Supp. 3d 21, 30 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[D]efendants
are correct that loan servicers . . . owe no fiduciary duties to borrowers . . . .”); Monreal v.
GMAC Mortg., LLC, 948 F.Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“Similarly, loan servicers,
like lenders do not owe borrowers any fiduciary obligations . . . .”).
111. See Tobie Stranger, Student Debt vs. Mortgage Debt: What Makes Them So
Different?, CONSUMER REPORTS (June 27, 2016), https://www.consumerreports.org/studentloan-debt-crisis/student-loans-vs-mortgages-what-makes-student-debt-different/ (describing
some differences between mortgage debt and student debt, including the differences in
interest, repayment and refinancing differences, and the ability (or lack thereof) to discharge
debt in bankruptcy).
112. See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?, CFPB (Sept.
13, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/whats-the-difference-between-a-mor
tgage-lender-and-a-servicer-en-198/ (explaining the servicer’s role in collecting mortgage
payments).
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language courts have used is unambiguous, recognizing that “[a] debt is
not a trust and there is not a fiduciary relation between [a] debtor and
creditor as such;”113 and further holding that “loan servicers do not owe
a fiduciary duty to borrowers.”114 It makes little sense to hold a student
loan servicer to a higher standard simply because of the youth or
ignorance of its borrowers. 115
A third argument to be made against a servicer owing a fiduciary
duty to a student loan borrower comes from a doctrine known as the
“business judgment rule.”116 This is “a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors or officers of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in an honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interest of the company.”117 At first glance, it would
appear that this rule should not fit in the student loan market since federal
student loans are issued by the government, not a corporation. 118
However, student loan servicers are indeed corporations, and as such
should be afforded the same benefits and protections as any other
corporation. 119 If the business judgment rule is applied to student loan
servicers, as it has previously been applied to loan servicers, then no
fiduciary duty would exist.120
113. Downey v. Humphreys, 102 Cal. App. 2d 323, 332, 227 P.2d 484, 490 (1951).
114. Moreno v. Citibank, N.A., No. C 09-5339 CW, 2010 WL 1038222, at *3 (N.D. Cal.

Mar. 19, 2010); see also Conquest v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. CV 16-03604, 2017 WL
1177106, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2017) (“Under Pennsylvania law, it is well established that
a lender does not owe a fiduciary duty to a borrower.”); Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC,
915 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Nor is a debtor-creditor relationship ordinarily a
fiduciary relationship.”); Iannuzzi v. Am. Mortg. Network, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“New York courts have held that a fiduciary duty generally does not exist
between mortgage brokers and borrowers.”).
115. See supra Part III.A.
116. See generally, Stephen M. Bainbrdige, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 81 83, (2004) (“The business judgment rule is corporate law’s
central doctrine, pervasively affecting the roles of directors, officers, and controlling
shareholders.”).
117. Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Eason, 17 F.3d 1126, 1133 n.5 (8th Cir. 1994).
118. The U.S. Department of Education is a lender for Federal student loans. See LOANS,
supra note 58 (“The William D. Ford Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program is the largest federal
student loan program. Under this program, the U.S. Department of Education is your
lender.”).
119. See LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“A loan servicer is a company . . . .”). It is also
worth noting that some student loan servicers are publicly traded companies, including
Navient Corporation (NASDAQ: NAVI), and Nelnet (NYSE: NNI).
120. See First Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d
510, 514 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that no fiduciary relationship should be inferred in the
context of loan participation agreements absent “unequivocal contractual language” since the
parties are obligated to make decisions regarding the loan “in good faith and in a reasonable
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Compliance Issues

A fiduciary duty seems regal in theory, but implementation of
such a duty may prove difficult. The Department of Labor recently issued
a new fiduciary regulation that will require financial advisors to act in
their clients’ best interest when giving retirement investment advice. 121
This regulation was met with much resistance, prompting President
Trump to delay implementation of some portions of the rule in order to
further study the consequences.122 Critics worry about the complexity of
implementing such a regulation, as well as the increased compliance costs
that could lead to brokers abandoning clients with small account
balances. 123 In addition, this rule could increase liability costs and subject
advisors to a higher risk of litigation. 124
While these are significant issues to consider, they may not
translate entirely to student loans if a fiduciary duty was imposed on
servicers. First, a loan account is fundamentally different than an
investment account in that the “consumer” in an investment gives money
to the financial advisor in hopes that it will generate future income, while
the “consumer” of a loan is given money now that she must repay later.125
This difference, in essence, removes the possibility of a servicer
abandoning a borrower’s account because it would eliminate the
possibility of receiving the rest of the money owed on that loan. 126
manner,” which is “more indicative of a typical business relationship among equally
sophisticated entities dealing at arm’s length than of a fiduciary relationship”).
121. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule-Retirement Investment
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20945 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).
122. Kristen Ricaurte Knebel, DOL to Propose Pushing Back Fiduciary Rule another 18
Months, 44 Pension & Benefits Rep. (BNA) No. 32 (Aug. 15, 2017).
123. See Bruce Kelly, Financial Trade Groups to DOL: Advisers Dumping Small
Accounts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Aug. 8, 2017, 1:34 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20170808/FREE/170809936/financial-trade-groups-to-dol-advisers-dumping-smallaccounts (“Critics say the DOL measure is too complex and costly and would force brokers
to abandon clients with small account balances.”).
124. Id.; Jamie Hopkins, New Fiduciary Rule For Financial Advisors Moves The Needle,
But In Which Direction?, FORBES (June 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
jamiehopkins/2017/06/14/new-fiduciary-rule-for-financial-advisors-moves-the-needle-butin-which-direction/#36e9a2774caa.
125. Aditya Shankar, What is the Difference Between a Loan and an Investment?, QUORA
(Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-a-loan-and-aninvestment.
126. See
Investopedia
Staff,
Loan
Servicing,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/l/loan_servicing.asp (“Loan servicing is the administration
aspect of a loan from the time the proceeds are dispersed until the loan is paid off.”) (emphasis
added) (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
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Similar to financial advising, however, it is likely that a fiduciary
obligation would increase compliance and liability costs, which in turn
would likely be passed on to borrowers. 127 Although this would indeed
increase the costs associated with a borrower’s student loan, it could be
seen by borrowers as an equitable trade off in comparison to the potential
costs associated with predatory lending practices that could raise the costs
and interest associated with a loan, as well as significantly damaging a
borrower’s credit. 128
D.

Should Servicers Owe a Fiduciary Obligation to Student Loan
Borrowers?

Persuasive arguments exist on both sides of this debate, and it can
be quite easy for one to simply side with those who are in the same or
similar circumstances.129 Many students will want to enforce a fiduciary
obligation on loan servicers because they are the ones dealing with the
debt, and understandably want the process to be as painless and
inexpensive as possible. 130 On the other hand, many creditors and those
interested in financial deregulation will want loan servicers to be free of
any fiduciary obligations because after all, these are businesses, not
charitable organizations, and this could make doing business more
difficult. 131 Regardless of the side one falls on, the question of whether a
loan servicer should owe a fiduciary obligation to student borrowers still
remains.
127. See Hopkins, supra note 124 (discussing the increase in compliance and liability costs
on financial advisors, and the likelihood that the increase in costs would likely be passed on
to consumers).
128. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (accusing Navient, a
student loan servicer, of illegal lending practices that resulted in borrowers having to pay more
on their accounts and/or damaged the credit of borrowers).
129. See supra Part III.
130. See Austin, supra note 1, at 333 (“As a result of financial stress, student loan debtors
experience high levels of personal depression, family dysfunction, adverse health effects, and
delay major purchases.”).
131. See Nasiripour, supra note 5 (citing to Navient’s motion to dismiss where it claims
borrowers cannot reasonably rely on the servicer to counsel them about their many options
because the primary role of the servicer is to collect their payments); see also Bruce Kelly,
DOL Fiduciary Rule to Cost The Securities Industry $11B by 2020: Study, INVESTMENTNEWS
(Sept. 21, 2016, 3:35 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160921/FREE/1609
29978/dol-fiduciary-rule-to-cost-the-securities-industry-11b-by-2020-study (discussing how
compliance costs for implementing the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule for retirement
accounts will cost the brokerage industry $11 billion in revenue over four years).
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The arguments that have been presented here lay the legal
foundation for whether one could enforce such an obligation, but they do
not answer the public policy question of whether society should hold
student loan servicers to a higher standard, or whether it would be better
to afford them the same protections and liberties that are awarded to loan
servicers in other financial markets. The answer to this question should
be a resounding yes—student loan servicers should be held to a higher
standard than loan servicers in other financial markets.
First, the case law holding that a fiduciary duty does not exist for
mortgage loan servicers should not influence the student loan market
because student loans and mortgages are sufficiently distinguishable. 132
For example, interest rates for mortgages are constantly fluctuating based
on secondary markets,133 while interest rates for federal student loans are
set by Congress and are typically higher than those for mortgages. 134
Additionally, mortgage loans can be discharged in bankruptcy, 135 yet
student loans are typically not discharged unless the borrower can prove
an “undue hardship,” which is quite difficult.136 Mortgage servicers can
be sued for improper practices, while there is currently little recourse for
individual student borrowers due to lack of consistent standards. 137

132. See Stranger, supra note 111 (describing some of the key differences between
mortgages and student loans).
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also FREDDIE MAC, 15-YEAR FIXED-R ATE MORTGAGES S INCE 1991, http://
www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms15.html (lasted visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating
average interest rates for 15-year fixed-rate mortgages in 2016 to be 2.93%, and 3.29% in
2017 through August); FREDDIE MAC, 30-YEAR FIXED-RATE MORTGAGES SINCE 1971, http://
www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating average
interest rates for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages in 2016 to be 3.65%, and 4.04% in 2017
through August); FED. STUDENT AID, INTEREST RATES AND FEES, https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/
types/loans/interest-rates#older-rates (last visited Sept. 14, 2017) (illustrating current student
loan rates for direct subsidized loans as 4.45%, direct unsubsidized loans for undergraduates
as 4.45%, direct unsubsidized loans for graduate and professional students as 6%, and direct
PLUS loans as 7%).
135. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (2016).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2016); see also Ciciora, supra note 6, at 147–48 (outlining
the Brunner three-prong test to show that not forgiving the student loan would be an undue
hardship, which includes (1) the debtor must not be able to pay the loan by “engaging in some
short-term, belt tightening,” or living by the bare essentials; (2) “showing that the current
financial situation will continue during the repayment period;” and (3) the debtor must make
good faith efforts to obtain employment and maximize income, while minimizing expenses).
137. Stranger, supra note 111; see also Ted Wegner, Student Loan Servicing Standards:
Should the Government Look to Other Markets to Better Protect Student Borrowers, 42 J.
CORP. L. 749, 763 (2017) (examining the lack of consistent standards in the student loan
market, and potential solutions garnered from other markets).
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Refinancing is much simpler with mortgages, as it does not lead to the
forfeiting of consumer protections like refinancing student loans would,
if they can even be refinanced at all. 138 Finally, mortgages generally do
not grow over time, 139 while even Navient’s CEO Jack Remondi has
acknowledged the complexities of the different repayment plans for
student loans, 140 which can cause the principal balance to grow
substantially over time. 141 Significant differences such as these warrant
placing student loans in a separate category from mortgages, and
therefore considering them independently.
Generally inherent in student loans is the lack of knowledge and
expertise by the borrower due to the fact that he or she is acquiring the
loan in order to obtain an education. 142 In such a complex field, 143 this
leads to a “great disparity of position”144 between borrowers and servicers
that is undoubtedly “very important or absolutely essential.”145 Such a
disparity allows servicers to make a profit by severely taking advantage
of borrowers,146 while the borrower becomes so increasingly hampered
by the overwhelming debt that he or she must put off or refrain from
important financial or personal milestones like buying a home or having
children.147 Additionally, it is likely that many borrowers will be
138. Stranger, supra note 111; Ryan Lane, 4 Things to Think About When Refinancing
Student Loans, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 29, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/student-loan-ranger/2015/04/29/4-things-to-think-about-when-refinancing-studentloans (warning that while federal student loans may be able to be refinanced into private loans,
it may cause interest rates to increase and even remove the option of having the loan forgiven).
139. Stranger, supra note 111.
140. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“Even
student loan experts are baffled by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal
repayment system.”).
141. Stranger, supra note 111; see also Ciciora, supra note 6, at 143 (explaining the
difficulties with student loan repayment, including the concept of capitalized interest which
result when interest is added to the principal amount of the loan, leading to the borrower
“paying interest on interest”).
142. See Cox, supra note 62, at 191 (“First, students are generally not economists.”)
(discussing the potential naivety of young students involved in the student loan process).
143. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“Even
student loan experts are baffled by the unnecessary hurdles and steps created by the federal
repayment system.”).
144. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482.
145. BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482.
146. The complaint in Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp. illustrates the types
of practices servicers can do to take advantage of borrowers due to their lack of expertise or
knowledge. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017).
147. Ciciora, supra note 6, at 139–40.
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burdened by their student loans for much of their lifetimes since the loans
cannot be easily discharged through bankruptcy. 148
While most student loan borrowers are not experts in the field, it
is essential that student loan servicers are.149 Servicers solicit the trust150
of student loan borrowers to do their job not only correctly, but also in
good faith,151 and should not be able to take advantage of that trust simply
because a borrower is young or ignorant at the outset of the loan. Some
have begun referring to this generation of Americans as the “Indentured
Generation”152 because they are a “class of indentured servants who must
work to free themselves of the bondage of educational debts”153 for most
or all of their lives. As much as one may wish student loan borrowers
were more informed or knowledgeable, the reality of the situation is most
are not, and so fiduciary obligations on student loan servicers should be
in place to protect borrowers who already must deal with the crushing
burden of student debt.
IV. CONSISTENT STANDARDS
Although imposing a fiduciary duty may be one possible solution
to student loan borrower protection, consistent standards and regulations

148. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2016) (making it impossible to discharge student loan debt
through bankruptcy unless the debtor can prove an undue hardship).
149. See LOAN SERVICERS, supra note 59 (“The loan servicer will work with you on
repayment plans and loan consolidation and will assist you with other tasks related to your
federal student loan.”).
150. This is a very important part of the language mentioned in Bret Binder to create a
fiduciary duty. See Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (“If a person solicits
another to trust him in matters in which he represents himself to be expert as well as
trustworthy and the other is not expert and accepts the offer and reposes complete trust in him,
a fiduciary relation is established.”).
151. See Remondi, Four Recommendations to Improve Student Loan Success, supra note
55; Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (“For some
borrowers, student loan debt can be especially daunting. The good news is that borrowers
can turn to their student loan servicers for help to navigate the complex repayment options.”).
152. Austin, supra note 1.
153. Austin, supra note 1, at 330–31 n.2 (quoting Janet Lorin, Indentured Students Rise
as Loans Corrode College Ticket, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2012, 12:01 AM), https://www.blo
omberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-09/indentured-students-rise-as-loans-corrode-collegeticket.).
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across all student loans 154 may be similarly effective. 155 Unlike the credit
card market 156 or mortgage lending, 157 there is no existing federal
statutory or regulatory framework providing consistent standards for the
servicing of student loans.158 While student loans differ significantly
from mortgages,159 the standards and regulations that govern mortgage
lending and servicing, as well as credit card servicing, could shed light
on possible solutions to student loan borrower protection issues. 160 The
key is to make sure any standards or regulations implemented are
consistent across all types of student loans, even if that regulation is
imposing a fiduciary duty.161
A.

Continuous, Clear Contact and Early Intervention

While there are various reasons why a student loan borrower may
struggle with payments, one issue that seems easily preventable is the
lack of information.162 Since the student loan system can be quite
complex, 163 borrowers frequently have issues with basic information,
154. There are four main types of postsecondary education loans: (1) Direct Loans
(federal loans made directly to borrowers by the Department of Education through the
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program), (2) Federal Family Education Loan Program
loans (originated by private lenders and guaranteed by the federal government, (3) Federal
Perkins Loans (administered by participating institutions and co-funded by the federal
government and institutions of higher education), and (4) Private student loans (made by
depository and non-depository financial institutions, states, institutions of higher education,
and other entities). The first three types are made pursuant to the Higher Education Act of
1965, while private loans are governed by federal and state laws rather than the HEA. Joint
Statement of Principles on Student Loan Servicing, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,389, 67,390 (Nov. 2,
2015).
155. This is only a cursory analysis in order to illustrate possibilities other than a fiduciary
duty, as well as the central need for consistency in any standards or regulations imposed on
the student loan market. For a more in-depth examination of potentially beneficial standards
and regulations, see Wegner, supra note 137, at 766.
156. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
157. Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 1024.30–41 (2017).
158. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 11.
159. See supra Part III.C.
160. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 12.
161. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5.
162. See Cox, supra note 62, at 198 (discussing the frequent inability of student loan
borrowers to obtain all accurate information on payment application and other important
aspects of their loans).
163. See Remondi, 4 Ideas for a Better Student Loan Program, supra note 55 (describing
selecting a student loan as a labyrinth); STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 4 (“Loan
servicers also comment that the complexity of the student loan programs may contribute to
these problems.”).
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such as how their payments are being applied 164 or whether they are
eligible to enroll in alternative repayments plans.165 As the Navient case
illustrates, even when servicers communicate with borrowers there is no
guarantee that the information will be clear or helpful. 166 Further, there
is little incentive for servicers to work with delinquent borrowers in an
attempt to mitigate damages and get borrowers back on track. 167
Like with mortgage lending, student loan servicers could be
forced to make contact with delinquent borrowers early in the process 168
and stay in contact169 to attempt to discover what issues the borrower may
be having and what loss mitigation solutions may be available. 170
Further, servicers could assign personnel, much like a case worker, to
delinquent borrower accounts to provide more personalized attention. 171
In addition, servicers could be required to publish eligibility criteria on
their websites for the various alternative repayment options. 172 Servicers
could also be required to apply payments to accounts on the same or next
day as they are received, and provide monthly billing statements to
borrowers similar to that required of credit card servicers. 173
Implementation of standards and regulations such as these would lead to
increased transparency and communication between borrowers and
servicers,174 which would be a significant step in the right direction.

164. See Cox, supra note 62, at 198 (“Students are frequently unable to find out from their
servicers how payments are applied when paying more than the minimum amount due.”).
165. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 108.
166. See Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief at 4, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017) (alleging Navient failed
to disclose deadlines and obscured key information).
167. Wegner, supra note 137, at 763.
168. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.39 (2017) (“[A] servicer shall establish or make good faith efforts
to establish live contact with a delinquent borrower no later than the 36th day of the borrower’s
delinquency.”).
169. 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40 (2017) (requiring a mortgage servicer to maintain policies that
help the borrower stay in contact during delinquencies).
170. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 109.
171. See 12 C.F.R. § 1024.40 (requiring a mortgage servicer to assign personnel to
delinquent borrowers).
172. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 112.
173. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666b-1666c (2016).
174. Wegner, supra note 137, at 763.
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Notice and Appeal Process

Similar to the administrative law process, student loan servicers
could be subject to a notice and appeal system. 175 After a servicer
conducts a review to determine whether a borrower is eligible for any
loan modification or alternative repayment plan, that decision could be
subject to an appeal and subsequent hearing. 176 Similarly, if a borrower
feels there has been an error on her account or relating to payment
allocation, she could request an investigation to respond to and correct
the issue. 177 The borrower would then have the right to appeal any
adverse decisions or findings, and be allowed some sort of informal
review, mediation, or formal administrative hearing before a neutral third
party.178
V. CONCLUSION
A fiduciary obligation would undoubtedly add to the workload
and compliance costs of a student loan servicer, 179 but the benefits
outweigh the costs. The disparity in position between servicers and
student loan borrowers 180 leaves the borrowers far too exposed at the
mercy of the servicer, as has become apparent with the allegations against
Navient.181 As much as one might wish that student loan borrowers were
fully informed and knowledgeable enough to protect themselves in this
situation, the empirical evidence shows that this does not happen. 182
Although the costs of compliance would likely be passed on to the
consumer, it is realistic to believe this cost could be spread amongst all
borrowers at a price that would make the increased cost an equitable trade

175. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2016) (requiring notice and appeal system for
administrative, military, and foreign affairs agencies of the U.S. government).
176. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note, at 113.
177. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 113.
178. STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 113.
179. See supra Part III.C.
180. See BOGERT ET AL., supra note 67, § 482 (asserting that “a great disparity of position
and this disparity [being] treated as very important or absolutely essential” may create a
fiduciary duty).
181. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Relief, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-00101 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); see also FAILING BORROWERS,
supra note 24 (discussing the allegations against Navient in their handling and servicing of
student loans).
182. See supra Part III.A.
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off to the amplified protection. 183 Although a fiduciary duty could be
beneficial for student loan borrower protection, other standards and
regulations could be implemented as well.184 Regardless of what standard
or regulation is implemented, it is vital that it be consistently applied
across all types of student loans, as consistency will help both borrowers
and servicers alike in handling the massive student loan debt in the United
States.185
SEAN R. WHELEHAN

183. See supra Part III.C.
184. See supra Part IV.
185. See supra Part IV; also see STUDENT LOAN SERVICING, supra note 3, at 5 (“Industry

commenters, including the two largest participants in the student loan servicing market,
identify certain student loan servicing practices where there is significant diversity in the
marketplace and suggest that policymakers require consistent approaches to common
servicing functions . . . .”).

